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TOWARDS MEASURING CROWDSOURCING SUCCESS: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY ON EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL FACTORS
IN ONLINE IDEA CONTEST
Abstract
Crowdsourcing campaigns in general and online idea contests in particular have reached popularity in practice
and research. Based on the open innovation paradigm, idea marketplace providers like InnoCentive broker
ideas between a potentially large-scaled crowd of solvers and seeking firms by hosting idea contests in the web.
So far, research has mainly focused on the setup of idea marketplaces, design patterns to define idea contests or
motivation factors to spur solvers. Mostly, extrinsic incentives, especially rewards for best ideas, are used to
guarantee high amounts and good quality of ideas. In contrast to the predominant qualitative and conceptional
research on online idea contests, we attempt an empirical study. We derive external factors, like rewards,
contest-duration or market-maturity, to construct a model depicting effects of these factors on the outcome of
online idea contests. We use a dataset from Atizo, containing over 25’000 submitted ideas and over 83’000
ratings to evaluate validity of our model. Our findings show that current design elements of online contest may
not contribute to the commonly expected effects. One interesting aspect is that using rewards to maximize quality
and quantity of ideas creates a conflict of goals as rewards can have perverse effects on the outcome.
Keywords: idea contests, crowdsourcing, open innovation, empirical study

1

INTRODUCTION

Online idea contest, also called innovation tournaments (Terwiesch and Ulrich, 2009) represent a relatively new
form of electronic marketplace. Also often referred as crowdsourcing (Howe, 2006, Howe, 2008) approach,
companies or institutions take an idea- or concept-seeking process, once performed by employees, and outsource
it to an undefined (and generally large) group of people in the internet. In this occurrence of an electronic
marketplace, ideas (potential innovations) are traded like information goods (Shapiro and Varian, 1998), which
are produced by working consumers and demanded by solution-seeking companies or institutions (Singh and
Wittman, 1988, Archak and Sundararajan, 2009). Like in other electronic marketplaces, operating the
marketplace itself has become a promising business model. Companies such as InnoCentive, Presans or
IdeaConnection run such idea marketplaces and offer crowdsourcing as value proposition. Through hosting idea
contests online they act as intermediaries between idea- or innovation-demanding companies (called seekers) and
a large-scaled crowd of potential working consumers (called solvers) in the internet. Idea marketplace providers
gain revenues as seekers pay for the opportunity of tapping the wisdom of crowds (Surowiecki, 2004),
particularly expressed through a large amount and high quality of submitted ideas. Thus, (Spradlin, 2010), CEO
of InnoCentive, suggests thinking about their business model as “the ebay of innovation”. Following this
description, idea marketplaces are causing changes to the supply side of innovation (Archak and Sundararajan,
2009). Through offering a large scaled base of potential solvers, including various customer experiences, skills,
backgrounds and tastes, seeker’s potential benefits are based on reduced matching costs and increased diversity.
In other words, seekers don’t have to search for suitable solvers, but pluralities of solvers can select tasks they
feel attracted to and submit suggestions unconstrained.
Various success stories of idea contests (e.g. InnoCentive, Dell IdeaStorm, myStarbucksidea, Cisco iPrize, etc.)
also accelerated research. Mainly from a conceptual point of view, information systems (IS) research deals with
design patterns of innovation platforms, economics develop models of prize structures or incentive schemes for
such contests, whereas sociologists mostly search for intrinsic motivation factors among the solver crowd.
Furthermore, the concept of idea contests is not an invention of the short termed past. E.g. research on free and
open source software (FOSS) communities or electronic brainstorming tools deals with the parts of the concept
for years. Despite this growing amount of research papers, basic rules and tenets of online idea contests have not
yet been carved into stone. One major reason for this is, that less empirical studies have been undertaken, dealing
with data from real online idea contest. Hence, even though there are various assumptions on influential factors,
there is less clarification which factors can be applied to support high and valuable outcomes, i.e. a plurality of
precious ideas. At a basic level, it becomes a crucial issue of idea marketplace providers (like InnoCentive) as
well as innovation seeking companies to understand, which external factors cause effects on the outcome. Once

understood, in return marketplace operators may use these factors as a driving belt to increase the outcome and
finally offer a stronger value proposition. This gave rise to our constitutional research focus:
Which (measurable) external factors take effects on the outcome of online idea contests?
To answer this question we start with a literature review, focusing on IS research as well as, economic or
sociologic work to provide a basis for hypothesis how idea contests should work from a theoretical point of view
(Chapter 2). We restrict the analysis on extrinsic factors, which are either given externally by the nature of an
online idea platform or regard definable structural and design elements of online idea contests. Thus, we exclude
internal and behavioral factors which are directly dependent and only measurable by interacting with the solvers,
e.g. measuring their individual efforts (Lakhani et al., 2006), their networks (Ye and Kishida, 2003, Huberman et
al., 2009, Franke and Shah, 2003), their skills, backgrounds and intrinsic motivation level (Lakhani et al. 2005,
Shah, 2006) or feedback processes during running idea contests (Nov et al., 2009, Yang et al. 2009). Based on
the literature review we develop 4 models, predicting the effects of external factors on the outcome of online
idea contests (Chapter 3). We evaluate these models by applying a dataset from practice, derived from Atizo (an
idea marketplace provider like InnoCentive). We describe data collection and run descriptive analysis (Chapter
4) as well as OLS regression, using the sample of all closed contests since the first contest in 2008, containing
over 25.000 submitted ideas (Chapter 5). Concluding we discuss the validity of our results and provide a glance
of implications on idea contest design on idea marketplaces as questions of future research (Chapter 6).

2

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

A plurality of partly overlapping or constitutive theories can be identified dealing with aspects of idea generation
processes. Hence, our initial task is to define how crowdsourcing and idea contests relate to other existent
theories (2.1) and subsequently to define tenets within these theories, which describe which external factors
contribute towards the outcome of online idea contests (2.2).

2.1

Classification of relevant terms

Within the last decades a plurality of partly overlapping terms has been defined within the field of open
innovation. Open innovation can be traced back to the definition of (Chesbrough, 2003) as the use of purposive
inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and expand the markets or external use of
innovation, respectively. Hence, the open innovation paradigm can be understood as the antithesis of the
traditional vertical integration model where internal R&D-activities lead to internally developed products that are
then distributed by the firm (Chesbrough et al., 2006, Laursen and Salter, 2006). Open innovation is set in the
field of R&D and thus a part of new product development, which is defined the complete process of bringing a
new product or service to market (Lilien et al. 2002, Ulrich and Eppinger, 2004). Furthermore, open innovation
can include user innovation (von Hippel, 2005) or customer co-creation (Prahalad and Venkatram, 2000), which
both refer to an innovation where users have performed a substantial part of the problem-solving process leading
to a solution. A group of customers, which solve a company’s R&D problem, creates a user innovation
community, which is defined as a distributed group of individuals focused on solving a general problem and/or
developing a new solution, applying computer mediated communication (di Gango and Wasko, 2009). As the
importance of customer inputs further increase with the market newness of a product, it becomes more critical to
enlarge user innovation communities (Callahan and Lasry, 2004). FOSS Communities are yet another example of
a user innovation community in which information, assistance, and innovations is freely shared (Franke and
Shah, 2003).
Research from the area of open innovation often references the existence of a swarm- or collective-intelligence
as defined by (Lèvy, 1997, Bonabeau, 2001, Bonabeau, 2009), and depicted as the wisdom of crowds by
(Surowiecki, 2004). The wisdom of crowds states that the aggregation of information in groups results in
decisions which are often better, than made by any single member of the group (Surowiecki, 2004). Various
systems or tools which are used to tap the wisdom of crowds and support collaboration- or idea productionprocesses have been mentioned: (de Sanctis and Gallupe, 1987) defined the term group decision support systems,
(Numaker et al., 1991) defined electronic brainstorming tools, (Berg et al., 1996) defined prediction markets,
years later (Piller and Walcher, 2006) defined toolkits for idea competitions, and (Back and Wagner, 2008)
defined group wisdom support systems. The commonness of such tools is, that they try to transform the
phenomena of the wisdom of crowds (or collective intelligence respectively) into a structured process of value
creation (Jones et al., 2009). This leads towards the definition of crowdsourcing. The basic concept behind
crowdsourcing is that crowds of amateurs can fulfill tasks and gather contributions at least as valuable but less

cost-intensive than internal R&D departments (Howe, 2006, Howe, 2008). Similar to open innovation,
crowdsourcing has a strong focus on R&D processes, especially on lowering R&D costs or enhancing R&D
quality (Howe, 2008, Leimeister et al. 2009). Crowdsourcing is increasingly seen as a strategic model to attract
an interested, motivated crowd of individuals capable of providing solutions superior in quality and quantity to
those experts can (Girotra et al., 2010, Brabham, 2008). Consequently, crowdsourcing can be described as an
process of open innovation harnessing or leveraging the wisdom of crowds. During implementations of a
crowdsourcing strategy, often idea contest (or innovation tournaments) are set up on company websites (e.g.
Dell Idea Storm, Cisco iPrize, IBM Innovation Jam, MyStarbucksIdea, Threadless) or on mentioned idea
marketplaces (e.g. InnoCentive, PRESANS, TekScout, IdeaConnection, NineSigma, Innovation Exchange, 99
designs, Atizo, etc.). Using idea contests to leverage innovation processes is also not an invention of the shortterm past, e.g. (Amabile, 1988) suggested idea contests to manage ideas within organizational structures.
Generally, an idea contest is a game in which several agents spend resources in order to win one or more prizes
(Moldovanu and Sela, 2001). (Ebner et al., 2008) define online idea contests as “the invitation of a private or
public organizer to a general public group to submit contributions to a certain topic within a timeline. An ideareviewers committee evaluates these contributions and selects the rewarded winner.”

2.2

Effects of External Factors on the Outcome of Idea Contests

As the previous chapter shows, idea contests do neither establish an entirely new, nor independent area of
research. In fact, previous research on open innovation, electronic brainstorming, FOSS communities, but also
research in the fields of economic contest design, behavioral economics or sociology also contribute predictions
on the potential effects of external factors within idea contests. A basic tenet of all these research areas is that
certain factors operate as incentives which potential solvers perceive and then activate. Hence, the right mixes of
incentives are those that appeal to or match the solver’s motivation for participating (Leimeister et al., 2009,
Riggs and von Hippel, 1994). Basically extrinsic and intrinsic incentives are distinguished. Accordingly, we say
that a solver is intrinsically motivated if he engages in an activity to feel competent and self-determining in
relation to the activity. There is no external reward, rewards are internal to the solver and take the form of
feelings he has on himself (Deci, 1978, Amabile, 1997). Within our research we do not focus on intrinsic
motivation factors. However, we will acknowledge the following:
Research showed, that attempts to measure intrinsic effects within online idea contests has to be based on
qualitative research methodology, i.e. mostly interviews or surveys among a crowd of solvers. Significant
intrinsic factors include the desire to acquire new skills, the desire to learn, the passion for problem solving and
exploration (often at the boundary or outside fields of expertise), enjoyment or the interest in free-sharing of
ideas (Lakhani et al. 2006, Lakhani and Wolf, 2005, Franke and Shah, 2003, Shah, 2006). For further qualitative
attempts to measure intrinsic factors see (Antikainen and Väätäjä, 2010, Lakhani et al. 2006, Stenmark, 2002). In
the following we focus on our primary interest, the idea marketplace perspective. We will depict several
extrinsic factors which may appear on marketplaces of idea contest. We structure the literature search for tenets
on external factors by separating the research areas open innovation/ crowdsourcing from FOSS communities/
electronic brainstorming and economics/ sociology.

2.2.1

Open Innovation and Crowdsourcing Research

From an IS perspective external factors often are associated or identified as so called “design elements” (Nov et
al., 2009). Similar to external factors, design elements are partly given by the circumstances of an online
marketplace and can be set or adjusted by the marketplace operator. (Haller et al., 2009) deduce 24 design
elements from analyzing 27 online idea contests. Among these design elements they find specificity of tasks,
contest period and reward as relevant external and adjustable factors. 9 design elements focus on the idea
evaluation process, which is not our focus and others are not adjustable, like the type of contest organizer. (Piller
and Walcher, 2006) develop a matrix, by which toolkits for idea competitions can be defined through the task
specificity and the required degree of elaboration. (Ebner et al., 2008) build up an online idea contests and
define 12 characteristics. (Leimeister et al., 2009) further develop this project and narrow down the list to 6
essential characteristics, including the contest timeline, incentives, problem specification and elaboration.
Additionally they define 8 types of incentives, including prizes, profit options and career options. They find that
getting aligned with a seeking company (i.e. the seekers brand strength) has a stronger influence than monetary
prizes. (Walter and Back, 2010) find similar results in a qualitative study of four crowdsourcing case studies.
These findings go along with a plurality of case studies in on open innovation, which all find that without direct
monetary compensation, a vast number of resources are committed to open innovation (Chesbrough, 2006,
Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007, Nickerson et al. 2009, Brabham, 2008). (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003)

find reasons of this in relative low costs of submitting to online contests. Hence, even low amounts of monetary
rewards can have sufficient effects on contributions. In their recent empirical study, (Yang et al., 2009) try to
prove this and conduct research on factors which affect the outcome of online idea contests. They define the
amount of attracted solvers as dependent variable and find that rewards attract more people as well as longer
contest duration or fewer words used to define the contest question. (Huberman and Romero, 2009) define the
possibility of free-riding as rationale of participating in crowdsourcing. They find that freely consuming the ideas
of others satisfies most solvers. Additionally they find that paid attention by other solvers, e.g. via the existence
of an idea rating system can additionally enhance participation. Research of (Antikainen and Väätäjä, 2010)
supports this finding. According to their study 2/3 of all solvers contribute due to the pure existence of a reward
system, which can contain a solver ranking, e.g. a top ten list, next to basic monetary rewards. (Morgan and
Wang, 2010) develop a two step decision tree to design idea contests which is based on the demanded degree of
disruptiveness of ideas and the solvers skill profile. Based on these factors they suggest different distribution
styles and absolute values of monetary rewards. Their basic suggestion is to use higher and more divergent
rewards, the more the skills vary among solvers.

2.2.2

Research on FOSS Communities and Electronic Brainstorming

Similar to idea contests, FOSS projects and electronic brainstorming groups are unlikely to be successful unless
there is an accompanied community that provides the platform for developers and participants to collaborate (Ye
and Kishida, 2003). FOSS Projects include external factors, as programmers often get paid by their employer to
participate in order to improve their skills, which is also seen as investment in human capital (Lakhani and Wolf,
2005). (Lerner and Tirole, 2002) find the biggest external motivation factor of FOSS projects in a delayed
reward, expressed by enhanced career opportunities of participants. (Nov et al., 2009) separate motivational,
structural and tenure factors as causes of user contributions in online communities. Tenure factors especially
focus on maturity of the group, measured by years of existence or experience. Within the research area of
electronic brainstorming (Michimov and Primois, 2005) find that group productivity and creativity is most
dependent on the factor of provided feedback. Additionally they find that social comparison, such as a ranking of
suggestions also enhances productivity. In contrast, (Stenmark, 2002) finds that the introduction of rewards lead
to poorer, i.e. uncreative, results in electronic brainstorming as a level of competition lowered the users’ ability
to be creative. Additionally the limited amounts of time as well as the detailedness of task description are seen as
positive external factors.

2.2.3

Economic and Sociologic Research

Economists are also interested in rewards as an external factor of idea generation. Absolute values as well as
reward structure are central research issues in tournament- and contest-design. In contrast, contest duration and
contest declaration aspects are subordinate as tournament models commonly use two participants and one or two
rounds of action (Archak and Sundararajan, 2009, Singh and Wittman, 1988, Yang et al., 2009). Even though
economists do no longer base their entire argumentation on the assumption of rational behavior, rewards are still
used as main external factor and thus, mostly used to model human behavior on marketplaces. But the effects of
monetary compensation on performance are no longer seen as monotonic, which means that offering money does
not always produce an improvement (Gneezy and Rusticini, 2000). Economic research recently states some law
of diminishing utility of rewards on participation in innovation tournaments. The main statement is that
relatively high monetary incentives can have perverse effects on performance, which means adding additional
incentives will decrease performance from some point (Ariely et al. 2009a). (Ariely et al. 2009b) further show
that tasks, which involve quantitative effort only, e.g. pressing a button as often as possible within a definite
time, are more likely to benefit from increased rewards, whereas tasks, which require a cognitive component,
include a level beyond which further increases of incentives induce negative effects on performance. Sciologist
and behavioral economics call this overjustification-effect, depicting paying too much can induce a crowding-out
of so called prosocial behavior and finally lead to poorer quality of results (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997,
Bènabou and Tirole, 2006). This is based on tenets like intrinsic rewards as superior to extrinsic in causing
action of individuals (Amabile, 1997), rewards significantly undermining the free-choice of intrinsic motivation
(Deci et al., 1999), extrinsic and intrinsic rewards not being compatible in incentive design (Deci, 1978) and
finally rewards undermining real interests, ignoring reasons and discouraging risk-taking (Kohn, 1993).
Economic research also states that investments of solvers tend to be sunk (Singh and Wittman, 1988), Hence,
with a large-scaled group of solvers, each will have relatively small chance of winning, so the winner's
investment and hence, the quality of the winning suggestion will tend to be low (Che and gale, 2003).
Furthermore huge amounts of ideas cause higher costs as the real value proposition offered by marketplace

operators comes in locating, filtering and communicating what is useful to the seeker (Varian et al., 2004). In
other words, large amount of ideas also causes higher costs of extracting valuable from useless ideas. Based on
this (Terwiesch and Xi, 2008) state that inefficiency of idea contests is resulting from the solvers'
underinvestment and this can be reduced by changing the rewards structure from a fixed-price to a performancecontingent type.

3

HYPOTHESIS AND PREDICTION MODEL

During chapter 2 diverse external factors (signaled by italic presentation) have been deduced from various areas
of research. Chapter 3.1. states hypothesis, derived from this literature review, 3.2 explains how variables will be
measured and 3.3. finalizes the prediction models.

3.1
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1: Higher rewards will lead to a higher outcome of online idea contests.
Hypothesis 2: Longer contest duration will lead to a higher outcome in online idea contests.
Hypothesis 3: A shorter description of tasks will lead to a higher outcome of online idea contests.
Hypothesis 4: Highly specific tasks will have a lower outcome of idea contests.
Hypothesis 5: The suggested type of answering will lead towards different outcome levels of idea contests.
Hypothesis 6: The maturity of the marketplace will have positive influence on the outcome of online idea
contests.
Hypothesis 7: The brand-strength of seekers will have positive influence on the outcome of online idea
contests.
Hypothesis 8: Idea contest where brand strength of a seeker and rewards are relatively high will generate a
high outcome.
Hypothesis 9: The specificity of tasks will response to the set reward.
Hypothesis 10: The requested type of answers wills response to the duration of online idea contests.

All derived hypothesis are collected and shown in Figure 1, an illustration of the potential external factors on the
outcome of online idea contest.

Figure 1:

3.2

Hypothesis of potential external factors on the outcome of online idea contests

Variables Measurement

We are restricted to measurable outcomes of idea contests. Literature suggests measuring effectiveness of idea
contests in 1) number of submitted ideas, 2) the quality of ideas and 3) the rarity of ideas (Conolly et al., 1990).
Other suggestions are to measure the amount of attracted solvers (Yang et al., 2009) or solely the quality of the
best (winning) idea (Girotra et al., 2010). We decided to exclude rarity of ideas as well as the quality of the best
idea as these are mainly subjective factors. Attracted amounts of solvers are also blurry as the stages of
participation vary from submitting ideas, towards commenting the ideas of others until only following contests
and reading ideas. An additional bias would be that users are allowed to submit various ideas to one contest.
Hence, we set submitted ideas as first dependent variable, meaning we count the total amount of submissions to
an idea contest. Solvers are allowed to submit several ideas to one idea contest and seekers can already mark
submitted ideas as “interesting” while a contest is still running and therewith maybe influence the solvers
behavior. Seekers intervened idea contests by marking ideas as interesting 170 times (which states 0.6% of all
ideas within our dataset). In a second regression we define the average quality of submitted ideas to an idea
contest as dependent variable. Therefore we use the given rating system within the Atizo community, where each

idea can be rated on a 5-point scale from 1, “almost useless idea”, to 5 “idea with options to win the contest”.
The rating of ideas is also done by the solver community. Table 1 provides an overview of the dependent
variables (amount and quality), the seven independent variables, derived during hypothesis building in chapter 3
and all corresponding methods of measurement. All variables refer to the entity of an online idea contest. The
task type is defined by the seekers description of task, especially by mostly given rating criteria, in which certain
submission styles are suggested or announced. Brand-strength and specificity of tasks are purely subjective
factors. In order to measure the effects of these we defined values of seekers brand-strength and task specificity
on the scale of 1 (lowest, worse) to 5 (highest, best). We tried to eliminate potential biases due to subjective
determinations of values by applying inter-rater reliability technique, i.e. multiple classifications by 3 research
assistants. Additional determination of values was undertaken by Atizo in order to affirm no local specifics have
been ignored. Fleiss’ Kappas of 0.94 (brand-strength) and 0.81 (specificity) shows high concordance among all
raters’ valuations (Fleiss, 1971).
Variable
Amount
(dependent)

Method of Measurement
Total submitted ideas of an idea
contest.

Variable
Specificity

Quality
(dependent)

Average quality of all ranked ideas of
an idea contest.

Task Type

Reward

The amount of money in Swiss Chf, Market
accounted for one or many winning Maturity
ideas of an idea contest.
Days from contest start till contest Brand
Subjective measure of seekers brandend of an idea contest.
Strength
strength (scale 1-5).
Amount of words used to describe the
task of an idea contest.
Dependent and independent variables and methods of measurement

Duration
Description length
Table 1

3.3

Method of Measurement
Subjective measure of required skill level,
necessary to submit an idea to an idea
contest (scale of 1-5).
Suggested answer types categories:
Naming, Designing, Engineering or
Business Solution
Month counted from September 2008 till
launch of an idea contest.

The Model

We use ordinary least squares (OLS) for multiple regression analysis to determine size and strength of
relationships between dependent and independent variables. OLS is commonly used during structural equation
models like this. It is also commonly used in cited studies on online idea contests (e.g. see Ariely et al., 2009b,
Giora et al. 2010, Lakhani and Wolf, 2005, Yang et al. 2009) what makes results partly comparable. The dataset
shows no runaway values, so we do not see the requirement of a logarithmic description (e.g. as in (Yang et al.,
2009)) and we found no bias through multicollinearity underneath independent variables. A test of inter-item
reliability for independent variables revealed acceptable Cronbach alpha of 0.72 (Aiken and West, 1991). Finally
this leads us towards four prediction models. The first two predict effects of basic external factors on quantity
and quality of idea contests as the following:
Outcome (Amount, Quality) = β0 + β1(Reward) + β2(Duration) + β3(Description Length) + β4(Specificity) +
β5(Task Type) + β6(Market Maturity) + β7(Brand Strength) + ξ
The second two models enhance the predictions of the basic model by including interaction terms between
variables:
Outcome (Amount, Quality) = β0 + β3(Description Length) + β6(Market Maturity) + β8(Reward*Specificity) +
β9(Reward*Brand-Strength) + β10(Task- Type*Duration) + ξ
In both cases the outcome is separated into amount and average quality of ideas. The term ξ covers a random
error. Only the extended models include hypothesis 8, 9 and 10, which all state that variables intercommunicate.
Hence, we cut out variables in their detached form (as in the basic model) and only use the combinations. The
data for the regression was obtained via access to the Atizo database, which included all closed idea contests,
including the corresponding rewards, amounts of submissions, average quality of submissions towards an idea
contest, start- and ending dates of contests and name of seeking organization. R (Version 2.11.0) was used to
calculate the regression models.

4

DATA COLLECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

4.1

The Atizo Platform

Atizo was founded June 2008 in Bern, Switzerland. The company defines its business model as the following:
Atizo administers a growing web-community of creative thinkers, who are characterized by their user, consumer
and special knowledge. For the mobilization of this community and yet other innovator teams, Atizo continually
develops innovation management tools, which are applied in innovation projects of companies and
organizations of all sizes and sectors (Atizo, 2010).
Atizos’ standard idea generation process is the following. Seekers formulate a task description including
suggested or required formats of submissions. Additionally seekers decide on rewards, whereas Atizo consults,
which reward seems adequate to the specified problem. In the following, the task is posted on the platform, free
for all signed-in solvers to submit ideas, comment on other ideas and rates other ideas within a public online
brainstorming phase. In a next step seekers select one or more best ideas (which does not have to be in
accordance with the average rating from the crowd of solvers) and divide the rewards. Hence, before or during a
running contest solvers are not aware, whether there will be one fix price winner or a reward split into the best
five ideas, but only the total size of distributed rewards.

4.2

Descriptive Statistics of Online Idea Contests on the Atizo Platform

The first idea contest was opened and hosted by Atizo in September of 2008. Since then 74 idea contests have
been closed. Contests lasted between 4 and 135 days, but 57.3 days at the average (Std Dev 20.7). 7013 solver
accounts have been opened yet, from which 1545 should be counted as active, requiring having posted an idea at
least one time every six month. 156.500 Chf of rewards have been distributed yet. This states an average reward
of 2200 Chf (Std Dev 1175.7) per idea contest (which is way below the prizes, InnoCentive offers to their
solvers). Atizo suggests seekers to use rewards between 500 and 10’000 Chf. Six contests were set up by nonprofit-organizations or seekers which requested to “donate an idea”, stating no rewards (0,- Chf). In general, idea
contests at Atizo are mainly of a general type. (Hallerstede et al., 2010) analyzed ten idea marketplaces and
found that contest on Atizo are rather focused on brainstorming and hence, less expert knowledge and detail is
required. However, specificity of tasks also varies among the Atizo platform and of course it is not forbidden for
solvers to submit highly sophisticated ideas. Seekers announced their idea contest tasks using 140 words in
average (Std Dev 24.8). Thereby the most frequent suggested answer type (and hence, the biggest answer
category) was the form of describing a product or strategy with text (35%). 21 Contests (28%) demanded
engineering solutions (e.g. a technical proof), 17 (23%) only searched for product or service names and therewith
could be answered by one line and 10 Contests (13%) requested ideas on design which includes to submit a
drawing in the appendix.
Within all contests 25’730 ideas have been posted, which turns to an average of 347 ideas per contest (Std Dev
164.8). 925, and therewith most ideas underneath all contests, were submitted to a question of suggesting a new
name of a student platform, offering 1000 Chf only. Only one contest includes less than 100 submissions, stating
94 ideas as a minimum. Considering different durations of idea contest, between 1.4 and 46.8 ideas were
submitted per day and contest, concluding an average of 7.5 (Std Dev 12.1) submitted ideas every day regarding
all contests.
In total 83.245 ratings of ideas have been submitted. Not each submitted idea was rated, but only 10’856 (42% of
25’730 totally submitted). The average value of these rated ideas is 1.68 on a scale of 1-5 (Std Dev 0.49). Hence,
the dataset for modeling the quality was narrowed down to these 10’856 ideas (still including all 74 idea
contests). This states the average value of a rated idea is based on 7.7 submitted ratings (Std Dev 5.3), and the
value of average quality of ideas within an idea contest is based on 1’124.9 submitted ratings (Std Dev 432.3).

5

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Using the dataset, described in chapter 4.2, we test 4 prediction models, derived during chapters 2 and 3, Table 3
shows the results for all 4 models. In each case, the basic model applies the basic variables whereas the extended
model also includes interactions between variables, which are requested by hypothesis 8, 9 and 10.
Measuring effects on the first dependent variable, the amount of ideas, the basic model shows a significant effect
of rewards (β1). This supports hypothesis 1. A second, strong effect is given by the market maturity (β7), which is

significant in each of the cases, the basic and the extended model. Further significant, but less strong, factors are
set by duration of contests (β2) and the seekers brand-strength (β6). This supports hypothesis 2 and 7, which
suggest that longer contest periods and strong brands will have positive effects on the amount of ideas. (β4),
which represents the effects of task specificity, is negative in the basic model, but positive in combination with
rewards within the extended model. This suggests that idea contests tend to have less submitted ideas as task
complexity rises, but high rewards are able to reverse this effect. Hence we are able to support hypothesis 4 and
9. The results also show that description-length (β3) and type of required submission (β5) style have no
significant effect on the amount of ideas. In other words, no matter how seekers describe a task or what kind of
submission style they suggest, solvers will send ideas. This also counts in cases of the extended model (β10),
where the assumption is that answer types interact with contests duration. Hence, we reject hypothesis 3, 5 and
10. Regarding their prediction quality, the basic model is slightly stronger, explaining about 60% of variance on
the amount of submitted ideas in online idea contests (compared to 37% in the extended model).
(βi)Variables

Effects on the average quality of
rated ideas per contest
Basic Model
Extended Model

Effects on the amounts of submitted
ideas per contest
Basic Model
Extended Model

(β0) Intercept

-29.31 (15.45)*

-42.6 (13.82)***

(β1) Reward
(β2) Duration
(β3) Description-Length

0.000
0.004 (0.003)
-0.001 ( 0.002)
-0.0566 (0.057)

0.002 ( 0.002)
-

-12938
(4770)***
0.052 (0.017)***
1.712 (1.020)*
0.196 (0.758)
-29.732
(17.513)*

(β4) Specificity

-11877 (4831)**
0.052 (0.812)
-

(β5) Answer-Type
(Naming)
0.045 (0.342)*
-30.796 (50.163) (Designing)
0.348 (0.203)
-65.999 (62.635) (Engineering)
0.357 (0.202)*
-36.642 (62.475) (Business Sol.)
0.070(0.162)*
-30.796 (50.163) (β6) Brand-Strength
0.035 (0.038)
20.810 (11.991)* (β7) Market-Maturity
0.009 (0.005)**
0.012 (0.004)*** 3.929 (1.419)*** 3.679 (1.429)*
(β8) Reward*Brand-Strength
0.000
0.014 (0.009)
(β9) Reward*Specificity
0.342 (0.118)*** 0.0273 (0.016)*
(β10) Answer-Type*Duration
(Naming)
-0.015 (0.011)**
-1.334 (2.606)
(Designing)
-0.014 (0.015)
-2.199 (5.373)
(Technical Sol).
-0.02 (0.008)***
0.442 (2.803)
(Business Sol.)
-0.018 (0.007)**
-1.334 (2.606)
N
74
R2
0.1712
0,6164
0,5972
0.3695
Level of signifiance
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
Table 2
OLS Regression Analysis for Modelling the Amount and Quality in Online Idea Contests
Our second, dependent variable is average quality of rated ideas per contest. A central statement is that in this
case different external factors have significant effects than in modeling the amount of submitted ideas. As Table
2 shows, within the basic model rewards (β1), duration (β2), description-length (β3), specificity (β4) and brandstrength (β6) cause no significant effect on the average quality of rated ideas within a contest. This suggests
rejecting hypothesis 1,2,3,4 and 6 in this case. Also the validity of predictions using the basic model is weak, as
it only explains about 17% of the variance in idea quality per contest. However, the prediction quality of the
extended model is unequally better (R2 = 0.62). Within the extended model, especially the variables describing
the interaction between external factors (β9 and β10) show significant effects. These results suggest that higher
rewards only lead towards better quality of ideas, if they are offered in highly specific contests. As effects of
answer-types were slightly positive in the basic model, this effect is partially turned around through the extended
model. The regression suggests that in all answer-types (except designing) a longer duration leads towards a
lower average quality of ideas. Therewith we see support for hypothesis 10. Finally, again the market-maturity
(β7) has a strong positive effect on the outcome.

6

CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS

Even though IS research has been concerned with open innovation (e.g. Chesbrough, 2003, Laursen and Salter,
2006, Thomke and von Hippel, 2008) or community design (e.g. di Gangi and Wasko, 2009, Ebner et al., 2008,
Nov et al., 2009, Stenmark, 2002) for years, the rules for online idea marketplaces have not yet been carved into
stone. Platforms (e.g. Hallerstede et al., 2010), design elements (e.g. Haller et al. 2009, Leimeister et al., 2009,
Piller and Walcher, 2006) as well as seeker- (e.g. Gassmann and Enkel, 2004, Lilien et al., 2002) or solverbehavior (e.g. Franke and Shah, 2003, Lakhani et al., 2006, Lakhani and Wolf, 2005) has been studied, but yet
little is known about the actual effects such factors might cause. Of cause, this is also partly due to the fact that
such marketplaces are young phenomena and thus research lacks of a plurality of datasets. To draw near the rules
of these marketplaces we searched for effects of external factors on the outcome of online idea contests. Figure 2
depicts our significant findings, separated by effects on quality and amount of submitted ideas in contests.

Figure 2

Effects of external Factors on the average quality of rated ideas and the amount of submitted
ideas in online idea contests

Limitations in space do not allow discussing each result in detail, so we concentrate on major findings. Given the
circumstances of an open platform, with less information asymmetries and the asynchronous suggestion process,
theory from various research areas is not sufficient to explain effects on online idea contests. Monetary
incentives are widely used, but (concerning our dataset) only have an effect on the amount of submitted ideas,
not on their quality. Idea marketplace providers as well as seekers should be careful with setting high rewards, as
they may cause large amounts of solver submissions, often of lower quality. This could lead toward higher
transaction costs (especially for unraveling valuable from useless ideas) and hence, lower the ROI of
crowdsourcing. Furthermore the effects of some basic design elements from IS research show no effects on the
outcome at all. This includes the task description or partly also the contest duration. In contrast we show the
existence of external factors, which can be equal driving forces of the market, but cannot directly be influenced.
E.g. when it comes to pure participation, i.e. submitting ideas, solvers are also attracted by the pure existence of
a seekers’ corresponding brand. Hence, seekers with strong brands may get informed by idea marketplace
providers, that it does not need a high reward. In general we find that amount and quality of ideas are affected by
different kinds of external factors. For idea marketplace providers this is important to understand. Seekers, trying
to incent higher quality of ideas by higher rewards may even create a conflict of goals.
However, there are also limitations to this paper. One is given by a strong finding. We detect a kind of
inflationary effect on amount and quality of ideas by the external factor of market-maturity. This simply shows
that the (perceived) outcome also rises due to the age (i.e. growth) of the idea marketplace. This represents the
fact, that more and more potential solvers signed in over time. Future modeling may consider using market
growth as a underlying effect. Of course one can also claim that our sample size (74 contests) is rather small. In
contrast, variables have been chosen wisely and there is no visible tendency towards multi-collinearity among
variables. Another concern is that we were rather selective in choosing the external factors. As chapter 2
suggests, there is a plurality of further factors that may cause effects on the outcome of idea contests. As
mentioned, our initial step was to exclude all factors which are directly dependent on solver behavior. Hence, we
see a next step in focusing on these factors, especially on effects of the crowd’s structure. Social network
analysis methodology might be an approach here. To finalize towards a system-theoretical approach research
also have to be conducted from a seeker based view. For now, we cannot claim that these external factors can or
should be used as driving belts to leverage the outcome, but rather to help all participants better understanding
market conditions and being aware of the possible external effects.
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